

# Secure Plugin for Automated Software Updates using Public Key Infrastructure for Embedded Systems

Malombe Victor  
Digital Learning  
Assistant, @iLabAfrica –  
Strathmore University

# Quick Overview



Introduction



Research Objectives



Problem Statement



Literature Review



Solution




Conclusions and Recommendations



References

# Introduction

- **Embedded System** - Computing system built into a larger system, designed for dedicated functions (Papp, Ma, and Buttyan, 2015).
- **Single board computers** - Used to build embedded systems.
  - Shipped with vulnerabilities



# Problem Statement



Most embedded device software is not updated after deployment.



Insecure update techniques



Design limitation – Minimal user interaction

# Research Objectives



To investigate how software updates are delivered and identify gaps and challenges in updating software in embedded systems,



To investigate the suitability of PKI in delivering software updates securely,



To design and implement an automated PKI based updates plugin for embedded systems, and



To test and validate the PKI based updates plugin for authenticity and integrity.

# Literature Review (Software Update Techniques)



SSH – NO SERVER AUTHENTICATION (TURNER, 2014).



PORT FORWARDING EXPOSES A NETWORK PORT ON A PRIVATE LAN TO THE PUBLIC INTERNET (RASPBERRY PI FOUNDATION, 2018).




FTP CLIENTS – TELNET ISSUES (BOE & ALTMAN, 2002).

# Literature Review

- Requirements for software updates (Simmonds, 2016) , and (Farrell & Tschofenig, 2017)
  - Secure
  - Robust
  - Atomic
  - Failsafe feature
  - Scheduling and distribution
  - Scalability

# Solution


## Auto Update Plugin System Architecture





# Solution

## Use Case Diagram



# Conclusions



IoT developers use unsecure methods



Lack of automation leads to more administration time and effort



Existing tools are platform depended and not free or open source



The aim of the developed system is to automate the update process of any custom software of single board computers in a secure way.

# Recommendations



IoT developers should be concerned about **security risks** during software updates.



**Public awareness** to the existence of this open source tool.



The open source community is encouraged to **evaluate, critique and give recommendations** to improve this tool.



Developers using private CAs and self-signed certificates should **install git server locally** and point to auto-update tool to it.



Integration with the single board computer **default software base**.

# Suggestions for Future Research



SECURING DOWNLOADED UPDATES.



ADD SECURITY INTRUSION DETECTION  
AND ALERT CAPABILITIES.

# References

- Papp, D., Ma, Z., & Buttyan, L. (2015). Embedded systems security: Threats, vulnerabilities, and attack taxonomy. 13th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust (PST), Izmir, pp. 145-152. doi: 10.1109/PST.2015.7232966
- Turner, S. (2014). Transport layer security. IEEE Internet Computing, 18(6), 60-63.
- Raspberry Pi Foundation. (2018). Access your Raspberry Pi over the Internet - Raspberry Pi Documentation. Retrieved on March 2018 from <https://www.raspberrypi.org/documentation/remote-access/access-over-Internet/README.md>
- Boe, M., & Altman, J. (2002). TLS-based Telnet Security. draft-ietf3270e-telnet-tls-06 (work in progress).
- Simmonds, C. (2016). Software update for IoT. 2net Ltd.



# Questions?





# Extra Slides (Post Presentation)

## Scope

This research focus only on **network security**, specifically on transport layer of the networks communications stack. This is achieved through Transport Layer Security **cryptographic protocols**. This only applies to data in transit, but not protection of systems or stored data.



# Recent IoT Attacks



## **Linux.Darilloz Worm (Nov 2013)**

PHP vulnerability

Script preloaded with default usernames & passwords

Starts a HTTP Web server on port 58455 in order to spread

Primary objective was to mine cryptocurrency

At least 31,716 identified IP addresses in 139 regions were infected



## **Mirai Malware (September 2016)**


Uses a list of 62 common default usernames and passwords to gain access

The botnet was responsible for a 600-Gbps attack targeting Brian Krebs's security blog ([krebsonsecurity.com](http://krebsonsecurity.com))

# Top 10 IoT vulnerabilities (2016)


1. Insecure Web Interface
2. Insufficient Authentication/Authorization
3. Insecure Network Services
4. Lack of Transport Encryption/Integrity Verification
5. Privacy Concerns
6. Insecure Cloud Interface
7. Insecure Mobile Interface
8. Insufficient Security Configurability
9. Insecure Software/Firmware
10. Poor Physical Security

# Update Checking and Delivery




# Public Key Infrastructure Operations

## Certificate Enrollment




# Public Key Infrastructure Operations

## Authentication Using Certificates




# Public Key Infrastructure Operations

## Certificate Revocation



# Public Key Infrastructure Operations

SSL / TLS



# Public Key Infrastructure Operations

## Cipher Suites

Cipher Suites (26 suites)

Cipher Suite: TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 (0xc02c)

Cipher Suite: TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 (0xc02b)

Cipher Suite: TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 (0xc030)

Cipher Suite: TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 (0xc02f)

Cipher Suite: TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 (0x009f)

Cipher Suite: TLS\_DHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 (0x009e)

Cipher Suite: TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 (0xc024)

Cipher Suite: TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 (0xc023)

Cipher Suite: TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA384 (0xc028)

Cipher Suite: TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 (0xc027)

Cipher Suite: TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_CBC\_SHA (0xc00a)

Cipher Suite: TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA (0xc009)